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ABSTRACT
This Note argues that cases like the humanitarian crisis and the conflict in Darfur,
Sudan, present an intrastate collective action problem that has not been satisfactorily
addressed by a traditional multilateral approach. Instead, the Darfur crisis demon-
strates the need for an expanded view of modern international aw in the face of intra-
state conflict that includes systematic intervention procedures and preventive aid, as
well as a multifaceted approach that recognizes and integrates NGOs and NGO alli-
ances. This Note asserts that the Sudan crisis has posed a collective action problem re-
quiring not only multilateral state collective action, but also multifaceted, coordinated
action between states and the proliferation of nonstate actors that have emerged from
globalization. Part I provides background on the genocide in Sudan and demonstrates
that this conflict is one of a number of recent intrastate conflicts. It argues that intra-
state conflicts and humanitarian crises are collective action problems. Part II argues
that humanitarian crises and internal wars require new international aw that encour-
ages collective, preventive aid and systemized preemptive intervention procedures. Part
III argues that these newer "collective actions" under international aw should involve
coordinated action between states and NGOs.
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J. 1. WELLING
INTRODUCTION
Some intrastate problems with international consequences-those issues that
arise from within a particular country but significantly affect other countries-
can be easily managed through unilateral or regional efforts. In a world in which
globalization' plays an increasingly important role, however, many current intra-
state problems are now so complex and destructive that they require the multilat-
eral efforts of many states. These internal issues have become collective action
problems-situations whereby individualized rational behavior by states leads to
sub-optimal results for the states system, producing a need for collective action.2
In other words, while many states would benefit if these problems were solved,
the solution requires coordinated action between states because states acting alone
lack the willpower or capacity to solve them.' However, the problem of intrastate
conflict is an atypical collective action problem in that multilateral state action
often does not satisfactorily resolve such conflicts; though states have traditionally
dealt with large-scale intrastate issues multilaterally-through a United Nations
effort, for example-this remains a sub-optimal approach due to its inability to
quickly resolve such issues of international concern. The genocide in Darfur,
Sudan provides a lens through which to examine and evaluate the international
processes that have evolved thus far to deal with internal warfare and humanitar-
ian crises, two situations that often require broad intervention. Fortunately, cer-
tain innovations made possible by globalization, such as increasingly sophisticated
coordination strategies developed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
deal with intrastate conflict and humanitarian crisis, may point to solutions to
intrastate problems that are preferable to the traditional multilateral approach.4
1. Though many definitions have been provided in academic literature regarding the meaning
of globalization, most academics would agree that globalization "implies, first and foremost, a
stretching of social, political and economic activities across frontiers such that events, decisions and
activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals and communities
in distant regions of the globe." David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt & Jonathon Per-
raton, Rethinking Globalization, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 67, 67 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinaf-
ter GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER].
2. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS,
AcToRs, PRocEss 640-41 (2002).
3. Collective action problems present a "tragedy of the commons" problem for the international
system. Other states gain stake in widespread humanitarian problems when the problems begin to
have significant consequences outside of their own borders or threaten regional stability.
4. With increasing exchanges across borders, one of the benefits of globalization is that the
consequences of internal strife are internalized more quickly by the outside world.
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This Note will argue that cases like the humanitarian crisis and the conflict
in Darfur, Sudan present an intrastate collective action problem that has not been
satisfactorily addressed by a traditional multilateral approach. Instead, the Darfur
crisis demonstrates the need for an expanded view of modern international law in
the face of intrastate conflict that includes systematic intervention procedures and
preventive aid, as well as a multifaceted approach that recognizes and integrates
NGOs and NGO alliances. This Note asserts that the Sudan crisis has posed a
collective action problem requiring not only multilateral state collective action,
but also multifaceted, coordinated action between states and the proliferation of
nonstate actors that have emerged from globalization.
Part I of this Note provides background on the genocide in Sudan and demon-
strates that this conflict is one of a number of recent intrastate conflicts. It argues
that intrastate conflicts and humanitarian crises are collective action problems. Part
II argues that humanitarian crises and internal wars require new international law
that encourages collective, preventive aid and systemized preemptive intervention
procedures. Part III argues that these newer "collective actions" under international
law should involve coordinated action between states and NGOs.
I. SUDAN AS AN INTRASTATE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM REQUIRING
MORE THAN MULTILATERAL STATE ACTION
A. Background of the Sudanese Genocide
The Darfur genocide has two complex components-internal conflict and hu-
manitarian crisis-that are typical components of intrastate warfare. The Darfur
crisis was brought about by cultural, political, and economic issues present in Sudan.
Darfur's ethnicities were politicized over a period of time,5 but this politicization
began to have significant effects only recently. Darfur was an autonomous sultanate
until the British absorbed it into Sudan in 1916.6 Until 1956, Sudan was governed by
Britain and Egypt.7 During this time, the colonizing British favored the Arabs over
5. See LANSANA GBERIE, KOFi ANNAN INT'L PEACE KEEPING TRAINING CTR., THE DARFUR CRISIS: A
TEST CASE FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 3 (2004), available at http://64.7830.169/kaiptc/
The%20Darfur%20Crisis.pdf.
6. Samantha Power, Dying in Darfur: Can the Ethnic Cleansing in Sudan Be Stopped?, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 30, 2004, at 56, 60.
7. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2005, Sudan (2005), https://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html [hereinafter The World Factbook 2005]; History-
World.net, History of the Sudan, http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.
asp?historyid=aa86 (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
J. J. WELLING
the Africans,' giving them greater economic and political power. The rulers who
assumed power after Sudan gained independence in 1956, themselves Islamic-Ara-
bian, continued governing the country with similar favoritism.'
The ethnic tensions in Sudan can also be traced to the recent twenty-one-year
civil war that has been called the "world's longest-running conflict."'" The war
was fought between the Arab-Islamic government in the north and the Sudanese
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) African militia in the south." The SPLA was
a secessionist group. During the civil war, the SPLA portrayed the war as a strug-
gle between the marginalized African majority and the Arab minority govern-
ment. 2 This publicized message, supported by statistics evidencing discrimination
by the government against African-native citizens, spread animosity among Su-
dan's African population in all regions, including Africans in the impoverished
region of Darfur.3 This contributed to the rise of two rebellious political groups
in the west-the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM). 14 Unlike the Christian SPLA, these groups are
African Muslim, and they are fighting the marginalization of African-native citi-
zens in Sudan. The SLA/M and JEM in the western Darfur region are separate
and distinct from the SPLA in the south, and these groups from separate regions
have fought separate battles to obtain rights from the Sudanese government.
The SLA instigated the crisis by attacking Sudan's government positions in
February of 2003.1' Attacks by the JEM followed. 6 On April 24 and 25, 2003 the
SLA led an attack on the government airport in north Darfur.7 This act far sur-
passed the government's expectations of the Darfur rebel groups' capabilities, and
caused an alarmist reaction within the government." It halted progress toward
8. See The World Factbook 2005, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. News Hour with Jim Lehret: Killing Conflict (PBS television broadcast Jan. 14, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june05/sudan-1-14.html [hereinafter Killing
Conflict].
11. See id.
12. GBERIE,supra note 5, at 4.
13. See id. at 4-5.
14. See id. at 6. The SLA refers to the Sudanese Liberation Army, and the SLM refers to the
Sudanese Liberation Movement. These may be used interchangeably.
15. Martin Plaut, Who Are Sudan's Darfur Rebels?, BBC NEws, May 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3702242.stm.
16. Nsongurua J. Udombana, When Neutrality Is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Hu-
manitarian Intervention in Sudan, 27 HUM. RTs. Q. 1149, 1153 (2005).
17. Id.
18. See GBERIE,supra note 5, at 6.
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the peace agreement in the south, though the SPLA and Sudanese Government
had come so close to signing the agreement that President Bush had saved a seat
for each side at his 2004 State of the Union Address. 9
In order to deal with the western rebels, the Sudanese Government recruited gue-
rilla forces from Arab tribes.2" These forces came to be called "Janjaweed" or "men on
horseback," and they eventually worked with the Sudanese military to raze Darfur's
African villages. 2' On September 9,2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell used the
term "genocide" to describe the aggressive government backlash carried out by the Jan-
jaweed.22 The attacks became a slaughter of innocent men, women, and children.
Economic factors played a role in the onset of the Darfur conflict as well. Su-
dan's three decades of drought, two of which occurred while Sudan was at civil war,
diminished its resources. As food sources became scarcer, crop growth diminished
and tensions between the sedentary African farmers and the nomadic Arab herders
escalated.23 Before the conflict, some nomadic Arab tribes had already pushed non-
Arab farmers off their land so the tribes' cattle would have grazing territory.24 Be-
tween 1987 and 1989, substantial battles broke out between these groups, and almost
3,000 people were killed." Additionally, after the forcible displacement of African
farmers in the Darfur region began, the farmers were often too terrorized to plant
new crops and were often forced to abandon their crops for refugee camps. 26 Farm-
ers' crops were also burned by the Janjaweed or military forces when the villages
were demolished.27 This contributed to the current food shortages.
19. Power, supra note 6.
20. See Amnesty Int'l, Sudan: Intimidation and Denial: Attacks on Freedom of Expression in Dar-
fur, at 2, Al Index AFR 54/101/2004, Aug. 2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
AFR541012004ENGLISH/$File/AFR5410104.pdf.
21. Human Rights Watch, Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support, at
2-3, July 19, 2004, available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/072004darfur.pdf.
22. The Crisis in Darfur: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (Sept.
9, 2004) (statement of Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State of the United States) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm).
23. See id.
24. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Is Told Darfur Situation Deteriorating,
Tension at Highest Level, Fighting More Widespread, U.N. Doc. SC/8236 (Nov. 4, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2004/sc8236.doc.htm.
25. See Power, supra note 6, at 61.
26. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR AND THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUBL'N No. 11182, DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR (2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm [hereinafter DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES].
27. Press Release, Physicians for Human Rights, New Report on Genocide in Darfur, Sudan,
Documents Systematic Destruction of Livelihoods of Three Villages in Unprecedented Detail (Jan.
11, 2006), available at http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/news-2006-0l- il.html.
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B. Internal Warfare in the Twentieth Century
Sudan's internal conflict is not unique; instead, it represents a continuation of
the rise in internal conflicts in the twentieth century. Internal wars are the new-
est, most destructive type of warfare." From the end of World War II to the year
2000, over 16 million people were killed in internal wars, compared with 3.5 mil-
lion who died in international wars. 29 In her well-known book, A Problem from
Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power studies genocide, the
most extreme form of intrastate conflict. She finds that "[diespite broad public
consensus that genocide should 'never again' be allowed ... the last decade of the
twentieth century was one of the most deadly in the grimmest century on re-
cord."3 Internal wars are taxing global resources in ways that in the past only
world wars or major international conflicts have-not only in lives claimed but
also in terms of social, economic, and physical destruction.
Internal wars are usually prolonged, with an average length of four and one-half
years, and have consequences that extend significantly beyond their official conclu-
sions.3 ' Internal wars shut down a government's perceived duty of responsibility to-
ward a segment of its population, leading to humanitarian emergencies that require
millions or billions of dollars in external aid. Moreover, difficulties arise when groups
who have fought one another for a prolonged period return to the same towns or re-
gions following a peace agreement. These difficulties can lead to the re-ignition of
conflict or lawlessness and impunity that remain after the end of armed conflict. 2
Causes of these wars range from lack of natural resources, caused by drought
or famine," to political issues, such as boundary disputes34 and unequal represen-
28. See DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 2, at 548.
29. RODERIC ALLEY, INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: WARS WITHOUT
END? 1 (2004).
30. SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 503
(Harper Perennial 2003) (2002).
31. ALLEY,Supra note 29.
32. Id. "The key root causes [of crisis in the Third World] are present in most African countries:
economies subject to sudden acute pressure because of the collapse of commodity prices, a weakened
state sector (particularly as pressures for democratization and human rights protection grow), ethnic
segmentation, and a culture of violence that is on the increase." Howard Adelman, Theory and Hu-
manitarian Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION: SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY 3, 9
(Michael Keren & Donald A. Sylvan eds., 2002) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION].
33. See supra Part .A.
34. Iraq is one example. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, IRAQ'S KURDS: TOWARD AN HISTORIC COMPRO-
MISE? 9 (2004), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle-eastnorth
africa/iraq-iran-gulf/26_iraq-kurds-toward-an_historic-compromise.pdf.
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tation. 5 Changing external incentives at the core of globalization,16 such as fluctu-
ating commodity prices,37 can also alter the power structures within a country;
this is particularly true in developing countries. In Sudan, for example, many
speculate that the market incentives of recent oil discovery and the exportability
of that oil influenced the government's decision to persecute citizens in Darfur. 8
Globalization can also contribute to downward pressure that exacerbates pre-
existing conditions in countries, whereby internal war becomes a means of self-ex-
pression and self-determination of cultures.39 In many African nations, this type of
pressure can be traced to colonization, the "old globalization" that imposed bound-
aries that continue to inspire struggles for self-definition among tribes, cultures,
and political groups." Many of these struggles for self-determination are present in
Africa, where borders imposed in the days of colonialism arbitrarily divided king-
doms, ethnic groups, and "political cultures," and simultaneously demanded that
the people within operate as a whole.41 It is not surprising that in countries like
Sudan, which gained its independence only in 1956, ethnic and political groups are
still struggling for equal representation and civil rights. 42 Sudan's twenty-one-year
civil war caused two million deaths43 which, when compared to the 3.5 million
people that have died in all international warfare since World War II, puts into
stark perspective the destructiveness of war for political and cultural self-definition
when left unchecked.
35. Rwanda is one example. "Beginning [in] 1959, with support of Belgian priests and colonial
authorities, Hutus launched [a] series of attacks on Tutsis, whom both Church and colonial au-
thorities had previously supported as [the] governing group." International Crisis Group, Conflict
History: Rwanda (Sept. 22, 2004), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action= conflict_
search&I= l&t= l&c-country=93.
36. "The exploitation of Indonesia's natural resources since the 1960s has brought economic
benefits to the country, but it has often damaged the natural environment and society in resource-
rich areas in a way that fosters social tensions and has led to violent conflict." INT'L CRISIS GRoUP,
INDONESIA: NATURAL RESOURCES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, at i (2001), available at http://www.
crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report-archive/A400517_20122001.pdf.
37. Adelman, supra note 32.
38. Cf. Power, supra note 6 (explaining that U.S. interest in oil in Sudan provided an incentive
for the government to end civil strife in the south of Sudan).
39. ALLEY, supra note 29, at 3;see Adelman, supra note 32, at 8-9.
40. Steve Odero Ouma, Reflections on the Causes of Conflict in Africa: Ethnicity or Failure of
Leadership?, ILSA Q., Sept. 2004, at 25, 25-26.
41. Id. at 25.
42. Power, supra note 6, at 59.
43. Samantha Power & John Prendergast, Break Through to Darfur, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at
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C. How States' National Interests are Affected by Internal Conflict Elsewhere
Governments have many rational and self-interested motives for intervening in
internal warfare in other countries, particularly if the long-term perspective is con-
sidered. First, internal conflict spawns criminals and terrorists.44 Both opium produc-
tion45 and terrorism flourished following Afghanistan's internal conflict.46 Bosnia was
infiltrated by al-Qaeda and used as a training base during the genocide.47 Osama bin
Laden lived in Sudan during its civil war and traveled to Afghanistan thereafter.
4
1
Second, internal conflict can, and often does, spread to surrounding coun-
tries.41 When the Rwandan genocide was left uncontrolled, for example, it politi-
cally destabilized the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)5 ° Civil war in the
DRC expanded into five neighboring countries'.5 The lack of a meaningful re-
sponse to Saddam Hussein's gassing of Kurdish citizens emboldened his behavior,
and the invasion of Kuwait followed.
52
Third, unchecked internal conflict undermines international efforts and cre-
ates an international culture of impunity. Allowing internal conflicts to continue
signals to governing persons that the international community accepts governance
through murder and ethnic hatred. 3 In A Problem from Hell: America and the Age
of Genocide, Samantha Power writes:
44. Top intelligence officials have stated that "[c]onstant turmoil in Africa is undermining the
fight against terrorism in a region that has become fertile ground for extremist recruitment." US.
Says Africa Turmoil Hurts War on Terrorism, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.dehai.org/archives/
dehainewsarchive/feb05/0251.html [hereinafter Africa Turmoil]. Additionally, CIA Director Por-
ter Goss said, "In Africa, chronic instability will continue to hamper counterterrorism efforts." Id.
45. Antonio Maria Costa, Preface to U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, AFGHANISTAN OPIUM
SURVEY 2004 (2004), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan-opium-survey-2004.pdf.
46. See International Crisis Group, Afghanistan, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/cfmid=
1266&1 = 1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2007). Afghanistan's long history of internal conflicts has tradition-
ally been supported by external influences. See International Crisis Group, Conflict History: Af-
ghanistan (Mar. 2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm ?action=conflictsearch&l=
l&t= l&c-country= 1.
47. POWER,supra note 30, at 513.
48. Mansoor Ijaz, Clinton Let Bin Laden Slip Away and Metastasize, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5,2001, at
A13.
49. ALLEY, supra note 29.
50. ROBERT F. GORMAN, GREAT DEBATES AT THE UNITED NATIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FIFTY
KEY ISSUES 1945-2000, at 362 (2001).
51. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So
What?), in GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 1, at 75, 81.
52. See POWER,supra note 30, at 236, 506-07.
53. Id. at 507
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If anything testifies to the U.S. capacity for influence, it is the ex-
tent to which the perpetrators kept an eye trained on Washington
and other Western capitals as they decided how to proceed....
Hitler was emboldened by the fact that absolutely nobody 'remem-
bered the Armenians.' Saddam Hussein, noting the international
community's relaxed response to his chemical weapons attacks
against Iran ... rightly assumed he would not be punished for
using poison gases against his own people. 4
Numerous other examples exist to show that in many cases of intrastate con-
flict, the willingness of the international community to intervene influences the
level of violence state actors will risk and contributes to more serious foreign pol-
icy issues.5
Fourth, the world community, but primarily developed nations, pays for the
humanitarian disasters that result from intrastate conflict.56 The humanitarian
costs of the Darfur conflict estimated in the United Nations' "2005 Work Plan for
Sudan" were 7.8 billion dollars and growing.57 These costs do not include the so-
cial and ethical costs of the more than 300,000 lives that have been lost. 8
Fifth, humanitarian disasters manifest in many forms, including the need to
house and care for numerous displaced refugees, food scarcity, massive unem-
ployment, and destroyed infrastructure. 9 The actions required for reconstruction
following devastation are more complex and varied than those required for pre-
54. Id. at 506-07.
55. See, e.g., POWER, supra note 30, at 507 ("Rwandan gunmen deliberately targeted Belgian
peacekeepers at the start of their genocide because they knew from the U.S. reaction to the deaths
of eighteen U.S. soldiers in Somalia that the murder of Western troops would likely precipitate
their withdrawal. The Bosnian Serbs publicly celebrated the Mogadishu casualties, knowing that
they would never have to do battle with U.S. ground forces.").
56. CIA Director Porter Goss addressed this problem when speaking to the Senate Intelligence
Committee in 2005, stating, "In Africa, chronic instability will... pose heavy humanitarian and
peacekeeping burdens." Africa Turmoil, supra note 44.
57. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan: International Donors
Pledge Billions for Reconstruction, IRIN NEWS, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/print.
asp? Report ID =46599.
58. Nsongurua J. Udombana, When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Hu-
manitarian Intervention in Sudan, 27 HUM. RTs. Q. 1149, at 1155 (2005).
59. All of these have resulted from both the Darfur conflict and Sudanese civil war. E.g., Asafa
Jalata, State Terrorism and Globalization: The Cases of Ethiopia and Sudan, 46 INT'L J. COMp. Soc. 79,
93 (2005); Christiane Amanpour, Sudan's Hellish Humanitarian Crisis, CNN, May 12, 2004, http://
www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/05/12/sudan.crisis.
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vention or intervention. Taken together, the costs of internal wars should induce
the international community to seek urgently preventive solutions and speedier
intervention, rather than allow intrastate conflicts to fester unchecked.
D. The Toll of the Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur
The Darfur conflict has created a massive humanitarian crisis, which is not
uncommon in intrastate conflict situations. The humanitarian crisis in Darfur is
multidimensional. The forced displacement, burned and bombed villages, and
terrorization of non-Arabs in Darfur led to the flight of refugees to western Dar-
fur and Chad.60 Those victims of forced displacement who were not killed in the
ethnic cleansing escaped to refugee camps, where they encountered problems of
malnutrition, disease, and unsanitary conditions.6 In the summer of 2004, the
death rate in Darfur had grown to three times the emergency threshold.62 In No-
vember 2004, one in three child refugees in Chad settlements suffered from acute
malnutrition, infectious diseases spread throughout the camps, and 72 out of 154
camps in Darfur still had not received food aid as a result of such conditions.6
Those who stayed behind in the villages had to survive on intentionally demol-
ished water sources and scarce food sources.
64
Government actors continue to commit widespread rape and gang rape
against women and girls during the forced displacement attacks and in the refu-
gee camps. 6 Torture, abduction, and arbitrary killings occurred on both sides of
the conflict, though the majority of these crimes were targeted against Darfur's
African-native civilians. 66 By November 2004, more than seventy thousand Suda-
60. See Amnesty International USA, Sudan: Civilians Still Under Threat in Darfur,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/regions/africa/document.do?id= E2E3D9827394BAA680256F240052A49A
(last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
61. DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note 26.
62. Press Release, World Health Organization, Survey Concludes Deaths in Darfur Exceed the
Emergency Threshold: Humanitarian Efforts in Darfur to Date Have Prevented Even Higher
Death Rates (Sept. 13, 2004), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/release/2004/pr63/en.
The emergency threshold for a humanitarian crisis is one death per 10,000 people per day. Id.
63. DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note 26, at 1-2.
64. See Sudan: Peace, But at What Price: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th
Cong. 11 (2004) (statement of Charles R. Snyder, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for
African Affairs); Power, supra note 6, at 68.
65. See Amnesty Int'l,Sudan, Darfur: Rape asa Weapon of War, at 11, AI Index AFR 54/076/2004,
July 2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR540762004ENGLISH/$File/
AFR5407604.pdf.
66. See id. at 12; The Tragedy of Sudan, TIME, Oct. 4,2004, at 44, 56-58.
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nese had been killed overall. 6 7 In Chad, 61 percent of people interviewed in the
camps by the U.S. Department of Labor had lost a relative. 6 These are a few of
the reasons why, in October 2004, the United Nations labeled Darfur the "worst
humanitarian disaster in the world. 69
E. Shortcomings of Traditional Multilateral State Action
The destruction caused by internal warfare and the costs of humanitarian aid
illustrate that Sudan-like situations have ramifications for the states system that ex-
tend beyond moral guilt. While states have many incentives for intervening in these
situations, history has shown that, whether acting unilaterally or through the United
Nations, states usually intervene late or not at all. In Rwanda, the death toll reached
800,000 before effective action was taken by the United Nations.7
An examination of how the U.S. government invokes human rights law in for-
eign policy helps to explain why states, acting alone or multilaterally, are unable to
satisfactorily react to situations like Darfur. In Bait and Switch: Human Rights and
U.S. Foreign Policy, Julie Mertus, codirector of the Ethics, Peace and Global Affairs
Program at American University, studied the legacy of human rights enforcement
throughout the United States' post-Cold War presidencies. Her goal was to examine
how U.S. human rights policy has been executed during the period of the United
States' dominance in the world.7' She discovered a lack of institutionalization72 of
human rights: Despite the fact that the United States provides a great number of
domestic civil liberties, and its administrations frequently espouse human rights
discourse in foreign policy discussions, the amount of attention human rights re-
ceive in U.S. foreign policy is ultimately dependent on the political actors, adminis-
trations' agendas, and other state interests at that time.73
Mertus found that in U.S. foreign policy, "[h]uman rights have to some ex-
67. Sudan: An Agreement, Sort of, ECONOMIST (London), Nov. 13, 2004, at 68 [hereinafter Sudan:
An Agreement].
68. DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note 26.
69. The Tragedy of Sudan, supra note 66, at 56.
70. POWER, supra note 30, at 386.
71. JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 25 (Richard
Falk, Lester Ruiz & R.B.J. Walker eds., 2004).
72. "Institutionalize" means "to incorporate into system of organized and often highly formal-
ized belief, practice, or acceptance." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1172
(Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1981). Mertus uses "institutionalization" to refer to the formal incorpo-
ration of human rights policy into foreign policy. See MERTUS,supra note 71, at 73.
73. MERTUS, supra note 71, at 73.
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tent become institutionalized, but they do not have an automatic influence over
identities, interests, and expectations."74 On the topic of genocide, policymakers
often "wanted to avoid engagement in conflicts that posed little threat to Ameri-
can interests, narrowly defined."75 Mertus states that "the story of human rights in
U.S. foreign policy is one of perpetual tension and resistance, of interpretation
and reinterpretation. ' '76 In fact, all U.S. administrations thus far have had signifi-
cantly inconsistent human rights records within their own policymaking.77
Three innate characteristics of government present obstacles for inclusion of
human rights interests in the foreign policy of every state government. First, gov-
ernments protect their primary interests,78 which include political power, security,
and economic wealth. Second, the human rights agenda, when it exists, must
compete with a number of state interests, and often these competing interests are
more closely aligned with the state's primary objectives.79 Third, human rights
norms are usually not institutionalized within domestic administrations, but dif-
fer remarkably from administration to administration in approach, definition,
and policy interpretation." Different governmental administrations have defined,
implemented, and enforced human rights differently. It is a mistake to believe
that human rights norms, as agreed to and understood by the international com-
munity, are fully institutionalized or enforced by domestic systems.
It logically follows that if a state as powerful and as professedly committed to
human rights as the United States finds the task of human rights enforcement
difficult, other nations surely face similar or greater obstacles. This conclusion is
supported by the twentieth century's record of states' failures to effectively halt
intrastate conflict and genocide.8' Though human rights policy may be applied
with more consistency in other state governments than in the United States, these
fundamental problems are ones every state must confront in legislating human
rights in foreign policy. Therefore, policymakers should anticipate that states,
whether sitting as members of the U.N. Security Council, acting within a re-
74. Id.
75. PowR,supra note 30, at 508.
76. MERTuS,SUpra note 71, at 26.
77. See id. at 73.
78. See id.; PowER, supra note 30, at 506.
79. See generally MERTUS, supra note 71, 33-73 (explaining the political pressures that have im-
pacted the human rights policies of the G.H.W. Bush, Clinton, and G.W. Bush administrations).
80. See generally id. (comparing the human rights agendas of the G. H. W. Bush, Clinton, and
G. W. Bush administrations).
81. See generally, POWER, supra note 30 (reviewing the situations in various states facing such
ongoing conditions).
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gional organization, or acting unilaterally, will be constrained by their narrow
self-interest and thus find it difficult to fulfill the human rights needs of other
countries in situations that are complex, demanding of resources, or that weigh
heavily against other state interests. They should also recognize that in some gov-
ernments, as in the United States, the success of human rights pursuits is also
contingent on political cooperation among government branches. 2
F. The Shortcomings of Regional and International Organizations
Though regional organizations like the European Union (EU), the African
Union (AU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are involved
in Sudan, they have not resolved the Darfur conflict in a speedy fashion. The
European Union has given millions of Euros to Darfur,83 and the African Union
has provided troops.84 However, until January 2005, the number of AU troops in
Sudan was restricted to less than one thousand, 5 while the area of land they
needed to monitor in Darfur was the size of France. 6 This was partly due to the
fact that Security Council members desired to limit the troops' mandate and to
refrain from giving the troops permission to protect civilians. 7
Even at the end of 2004, the African Union lacked the most basic supplies, such
as tents or transportation, which the African Union could not afford and other
states were unwilling to provide.8 The few donated supplies were disappointing as
well. For example, while Germany provided the AU troops with computers for
technical support, the instructions for their use were in German. 9 Frances Deng, a
Sudanese diplomat, urged on January 14, 2005, that what Darfur needed was sup-
port for the African Union to meet its challenge, 90 but that only U.N. Member States
outside of the African Union could provide the type of support needed.
82. Periods in Bill Clinton's presidency demonstrated this problem. See MERTUS, supra note 71,
at 47-49.
83. European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), Crisis in Darfur: The European Commis-
sion's Response, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/field/sudan/darfur/echoen.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
84. More African Troops Go to Darfur, BBC News Online, Dec. 16, 2004, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4102613.stm.
85. Killing Conflict, supra note 10.
86. John Corzine and Richard Holbrooke, Editorial, Help the Afican Union, WASH. PosT, Sept. 9,
2004, at A27.
87. See Killing Conflict, supra note 10.
88. Sudan: An Agreement, supra note 67.
89. Id.
90. Killing Conflict, supra note 10.
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The responses of the United Nations' branches and committees were timelier
and occurred on more fronts than in past conflicts; however, procedural obstacles
within this international organization still loomed large. The threat of a veto
from China or Russia deterred the U.N. Security Council from acting with
greater swiftness or applying sanctions. China and Russia repeatedly threatened
to use their individual vetoes to block all U.N. Security Council efforts to place
sanctions on the Sudanese government, in order to protect their private economic
interests." As a result, the international community allowed the atrocities to per-
sist for more than two years without placing any sanctions on the government, the
main perpetrator. Russia blocked the vote because it is an arms supplier for the
Sudanese government, and China blocked these votes initially to protect its oil
interest. 2 Additionally, in January 2005, a specially appointed U.N. commission
to the Security Council voted that the Darfur atrocities should not be called geno-
cide, though it claimed the acts were "no less serious and heinous than genocide."93
Identifying genocide has, since its acceptance into international law, been a diffi-
cult hurdle for governments to clear, because declaring genocide comes with in-
creased pressure, if not a legal responsibility to work toward its end.9 4 Such
difficulties at the U.N. limited the mandate of the AU troops who were not given
political permission to carry out adequate peacekeeping or peace enforcement. As
a result, AU troops served merely monitoring and rescue functions. With proper
backing and permission granted through a U.N. Chapter VII mandate, how-
ever, they could have defended civilians.
These realities indicate that the U.N. system remains a system governed pri-
marily by states and individual state interests, so that states acting through inter-
national or regional systems cannot yet satisfactorily preempt intrastate conflict or
react to situations like that in Sudan. Roderic Alley claims that international en-
forcement in the traditional sense will not allow for adequate and timely resolu-
tion of intrastate conflict that has reached the level of human rights abuse.96 He
91. Global Policy Forum, Sudan, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudanindex.htm
(last visited Jan. 18, 2007); Human Rights Watch, The United Nations and Darfur (Jan. 2005),
http://hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/3.htm.
92. Human Rights Watch, supra note 91.
93. Warren Hoge, U.N. Finds Crimes, Not Genocide in Darfur, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at A3
(quoting a U.N. commission report on the violence in the Darfur region of Sudan).
94. See Samantha Power, It's Not Enough to Call It Genocide, TIME, Oct. 4, 2004, at 63; Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
[hereinafter Genocide Convention].
95. See Killing Conflict, supra note 10.
96. See ALLEY, supra note 29, at 96.
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writes that "external responses to rights violations ... incurred [by] internal con-
flict continue[] to exhibit delay, equivocation and ambiguity,"97 though improve-
ments in the past decade have led to greater human rights awareness. Alley
concludes that the "state-based international order ... is inadequately equipped to
deal with the moral, political and diplomatic dilemmas generated by the violation
of rights during internal conflict."98
II. GOVERNMENTS NEED A DEFINED AND EFFICIENT INTERVENTION
PROCEDURE AND AN APPROACH THAT INVOLVES PREVENTIVE AID
Preventive action or intervention in intrastate conflict situations like Darfur
would be less costly than reconstruction. Preventive action, which is preferable to
intervention, would be most effective in two forms: preventive aid and a precon-
ceived plan of action for military and humanitarian intervention once crises have
begun. Governments should seek to optimize the resources they give to resolving
internal warfare and repairing its effects by strengthening preventive aid pro-
grams and institutionalizing into international law the possibility of humanitar-
ian intervention when certain criteria have been met.99
A. Preventive Aid
According to a noted economist, "75 per cent of aid sent to places such as Africa
never translates into real development assistance; it is spent on emergencies rather
than on solving the basic problems."'' 0 Jeffrey Sachs, renowned economist from Co-
lumbia University and leader of the United Nations Millennium Project (Millen-
nium Project), argues that Africa desperately needs a dedicated preventive aid
program in order to become a self-sustaining place of growth.101 In 2004, Sachs co-
authored a Brookings Paper on Economic Activity entitled Ending Africa's Poverty
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. For a discussion of such criteria, see infra Part lI.B.
100. CANADIAN INT'L DEV. AGENCY, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION DAYS (ICD) 2004: THE
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: MOVING FROM CONSENSUS TO MOMENTUM 6 (2004), available at
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/International%2OCooperation/
$file/ICD-Final-Report-e.pdf.
101. See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs et al., Ending Africa's Poverty Trap, in 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 117 (William C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 2004) (discussing Africa's
development crisis). Sachs was recently named "World's Best Economist" by Time Magazine.
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Trap in which he described the dire economic situation of Africa's sub-Saharan
countries and their perpetual cycle of poverty. He concluded that this part of Africa
would not be able to pull itself out of this poverty trap without a significant amount
of external aid invested methodically,0 2 with close monitoring and directionY1
Research undertaken by the Millennium Project and others shows that internal
conflict is significantly linked to poverty. 0 4 The overview report of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) states, "[oln average a negative economic growth
shock of 5 percentage points increases civil war risks by about 50 percent. And the
risk of violent civil conflict declines steadily as national incomes increase. While vio-
lent conflicts surely result from a combination of factors, poverty creates condi-
tions for igniting and sustaining conflict."'0 5 Michael Brown, Director of the Project
on Internal Conflict at the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA) at
the John F. Kennedy School of Government, has stated that, "[t]he importance of
the economic roots of internal conflict cannot be underestimated: if international
actors are serious about preventing internal conflict and civil war,.., they have to
address the economic sources of conflict in troubled societies."'0 6
As previously mentioned, a significant contributor to the Sudan conflict is the
economic and agricultural situation that exists there.' In 1999, the United Nations
found that sixty countries in sub-Saharan Africa were economically worse off than
they were in 1980.18 Sudan experienced a decline in food production in those years,
which is partly attributable to the drought but also to the lack of basic farming re-
quirements such as agriculture, fertilizer, and roads in sub-Saharan Africa. 9 Fur-
thermore, Sudan is one of thirty-three sub-Saharan African countries in which the
population-weighted average income is around seventy-four cents per day."0
Many now believe that armed conflicts must be viewed in the context of their root
102. Id. at 121-23.
103. See id. at 149.
104. U.N. Millennium Project, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millen-
nium Development Goals: Overview, 8 (2005), available at http://www.unmilleniumproject.org/
documents/overviewEngl-23LowRes.pdf [hereinafter Overview].
105. Id.
106. Michael E. Brown, Internal Conflict and International Action, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 603, 610 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1996).
107. See supra Part 1.A.
108. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 12-13 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting Judith Miller, Globalization Widens Rich-Poor Gap,
U.N. Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at A8).
109. Sachs et al., supra note 101, at 132-33.
110. Id. at 118. This equals an average annual income of $271. Id. This level falls within the defi-
nition of "extreme poverty" (income of less than a dollar a day), which is the most desperate level
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causes, such as poverty, political representation, and uneven distribution of resources.'"
Such thinking led to the creation of the Millennium Project, a systems-building ap-
proach undertaken by the U.N. General Assembly in 2002 to reduce drastically the
amount of extreme poverty in the world by 2015.12 While the focus of the project is on
extreme poverty worldwide, African countries are heavily targeted because of their
need.' 3 Every member state of the general assembly has approved the effort."4 Under
the MDGs, aid is to be distributed to Africa according to a researched distribution
plan in carefully timed installments. A highly educated task force, which included
more than 250 experts,"' came together to create this plan. Currently, the key goal of
many groups is to solicit increased investment in the MDGs from developed countries,
with the target contribution being 0.7 percent annual GDP per country."6
In recognition of the contribution that extreme poverty often makes to intrastate
conflict, 17 state leaders are viewing and construing development aid as a form of con-
flict prevention. At the G-8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland in July 2005, heads of
state forgave the International Monetary Fund debt of fourteen African countries and
pledged $25 billion in aid to Africa by the year 2010.18 The leaders described these
pledges as both humanitarian and antiterrorist-antiterrorist because they believed
the aid would help prevent the rise of terrorist groups in impoverished nations.
B. Humanitarian Intervention
Not all intrastate conflicts can be prevented. For this reason, when such con-
flicts occur, states should continue to support humanitarian intervention taken
of poverty found in the world. See JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILI-
TIES FOR OUR TIME 20 (2005).
111. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 22,
3.19 (2001), available at http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/960-7 [hereinafter THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT].
112. U.N. Millennium Project, About the U.N. Millennium Project, http://www.unmillennium-
project.org/who/index.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2007) [hereinafter About the U.N. Millennium
Project].
113. See Overview, supra note 104, at 14-16.
114. See U.N. Millennium Project, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, 2-3 (2005), available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/docu-
ments/MainReportComplete-lowres.pdf [hereinafter Investing in Development].
115. About the U.N. Millennium Project,supra note 112.
116. SACHS, supra note 110, at 302-07.
117. See Investing in Development, supra note 114, at 9.
118. See Jim VandeHei & Paul Blustein, African Aid is Doubled by G-8: Anti-Terror Solidarity
Helps Blair Win Deal, WASH. POST, July 9,2005, at Al.
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with the approval of the U.N. Security Council, when certain conditions are met.
Humanitarian intervention generally refers to "'[t]he threat or use of force by a
state or states abroad, for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a seri-
ous violation of fundamental human rights.""' 9
Currently, the U.N. Charter allows exceptions to its prohibition on the use of
force for individual or collective self-defense (Chapter VII, Article 51) or when
authorized by the Security Council after it has determined an existence of a threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression (Chapter VII). 2 ° The U.N.
Security Council usually justifies humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter, which states that the Security Council may take action to
"maintain or restore international peace and security"'2 when there are threats or
"breach[es] of the peace.' 1 2
1. The Drawbacks of Humanitarian Intervention
While states have justified humanitarian intervention in the past under the
U.N. Charter, and humanitarian intervention has proved effective, governments
still show a strong presumption against it 123 for a number of legal and policy-based
reasons.'24 One commonly cited concern is that allowing an exception to the prin-
ciple of state sovereignty under international law for forcible humanitarian inter-
vention opens the door to abuse and would be used to justify interventions
undertaken for selfish political reasons, rather than out of a genuine motivation to
suppress human rights violations.'2 ' This could lead to intervening states behav-
ing as occupiers instead of protectors. Others worry that allowing intervention
119. OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM & TOM WOODHOusE, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN CONTEMPO-
RARY CONFLICT 3 (1996) (citing W. Verwey, Legality of Humanitarian Intervention After the Cold
War, in THE CHALLENGE TO INTERVENE: A NEW ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS? 113 (Elizabeth
Ferris ed., 1992)).
120. Wayne Sandholtz, Humanitarian Intervention: Global Enforcement of Human Rights?, in
GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 201, 206 (Alison Brysk ed., 2002).
121. U.N. Charter art. 39.
122. Id.
123. "[G]overnments are wary of creating a general right.., of collective humanitarian interven-
tion. Sandholtz, supra note 120, at 208.
124. While I intend to outline some of the arguments for and against a doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, I do not attempt here to provide a comprehensive list of all of the policy and legal
arguments relating to the topic.
125. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Debate Surveyed Pros and Cons of Humani-
tarian Intervention, Globalization, Poverty, U.N. Reform, Observes Assembly President, U.N.
Doc. GA/SM/105 (Oct. 2, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991002.
gasm 105.doc.html; Gunnar Burge, Chairman, Norwegian Nobel Comm., Nobel Peace Prize Pre-
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would lead to regional or international conflicts by causing an escalation in vio-
lence."26 Another concern is that once exceptions to state sovereignty are created, a
slippery slope may result, making intervention the norm.'27
There is also the fear of a "Black Hawk Down" scenario.2 This concern recog-
nizes that interventions can become unpredictable, more complex than originally
estimated, and may lead to unintended consequences and casualties. Eighteen U.S.
soldiers were killed in the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1993 when a mission
seeking to capture a few of General Mohamed Aidid's advisors went drastically
awry.29 Twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers were also killed in the midst of this
humanitarian intervention. 30 When President Clinton was asked about U.S. inter-
vention in Rwanda, he analogized it to Somalia, saying "don't go into one of these
things and say, as the U.S. said ... in Somalia, 'Maybe we'll be done in a month
because it's a humanitarian crisis.' . . . Because there are almost always political
problems and sometimes military conflicts, which bring about these crises."'3 Other
states' representatives made similar statements following the U.N.-approved inter-
ventions in Somalia. 32
Intervention is also expensive and can demand the installation of a temporary
or permanent rule of law.33 In July 1997, Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared
that the United Nations lacked "the institutional capacity to conduct military en-
forcement measures.' 1 34 When the United Nations undertook direct administra-
tion of both Kosovo and East Timor in 1999,13 the mission became complicated
sentation Speech at the Oslo City Hall (Dec. 10, 2001) (transcript available at http://nobelprize.
org/nobel-prizes/peace/laureates/2001/presentation-speech.html).
126. PoWER, supra note 30, at 317; See Hans Corell, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs,
Legal Counsel of the U.N., Keynote Address at the Conference on the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention: To Intervene or Not (Apr. 19, 2001),availableat http://www.unorg/law/counsel/eng-
lish/duke01.pdf.
127. See, e.g., BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 137-39 (2002).
128. The film Black Hawk Down portrays the capture and murder of the eighteen U.S. soldiers
in the Special Forces Unit that attempted to intervene militarily in Somalia in 1993. BLACK HAWK
DOWN (Revolution Studios 2001).
129. PoWER, supra note 30, at 316-17; LEPARD, SUpra note 127, at 14.
130. LEPARD,SUpra note 127, at 13.
131. POWER,sUpra note 30, at 374-375 (quoting Nightline (ABC television broadcast May 4, 1994));
see also Riadiger Wolfrum, The U.N. Experience in Modern Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL INTER-
VENTION,Supra note 32, at 95, 97 (noting the U.S. reduction in commitment to military interven-
tion following Somalia, unless it has control of the operation).
132. See, for example, LEPARD,Supra note 127, at 233, for a Brazilian representative's point of view.
133. See Corell, supra note 126, at 9-11.
134. LEPARD, SUpra note 127, at 234.
135. DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN,SUpra note 2, at 245-46.
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and expensive. 13 6 It is debatable whether the United Nations is equipped to fund
such efforts on its own.
137
The ambiguity of the relevant legal criteria for the exception of humanitarian
intervention is another problem. Many proposed criteria have a "know it when
you see it" aspect that some find disconcerting when dealing with such a serious
issue as the circumvention of state sovereignty,' 3' and most invoke unquantifiable
terms such as "a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations."
39
2. Why Humanitarian Intervention is Necessary and Feasible
As compelling as the concerns or arguments against humanitarian intervention
may be, the arguments on the other side are ultimately weightier. Kofi Annan raised
the moral issue at the U.N. General Assembly in 1999 and 2000, when he asked the
international community to find consensus on how states should respond to "a
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of human rights that
affect every precept of our common humanity[.] "140 Economic arguments that hu-
manitarian intervention is significantly cheaper than post-conflict repair can also be
persuasive. Though intervention can be unpredictable and expensive, evidence
shows that in multiple cases it was a less costly alternative to allowing intrastate con-
flict to continue. The estimated cost of placing a U.S. peacekeeping force in Rwanda
during the genocide, for example, was $30 million.'4' The United States instead
spent $237 million on humanitarian relief alone to repair the country following the
genocide. 42 When NATO countries circumvented the U.N. Security Council's rul-
ings by bombing Serbia in 1999, they ended a three-and-a-half year war in ten
136. The U.N. budget for Kosovo was $64 million, a quarter of which was spent the first day of
the bombing. Three weeks' worth of bombing occurred in total. POWER, Supra note 30, at 393,
465.
137. See LEPARD, supra note 127, at 234; Corell, supra note 126, at 9.
138. See generally Corell,supra note 126, at 8 (suggesting that arguments for humanitarian inter-
vention be analyzed similarly to the legal doctrine of "necessity"); Michael Noonan, The Question
of Humanitarian Intervention: A Conference Report, FOREIGN POL'Y RES. INST. WIRE, June 2001,
http://www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0905.200106.noonan.conference.html (discussing the view that the
term "genocide" has been so watered down that it has lost its "legitimacy and serious connota-
tions").
139. Bruce Cronin, Multilateral Intervention and the International Community, in INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION, supra note 32, at 147, 158 (quoting U.N. Economic and Social Council Resolution
1503 (XLVIII), 2, 48 U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. IA, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1
(1970)).
140. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 111, at VII.
141. POWER,supra note 30, at 381.
142. Id.
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weeks, freeing 1.7 million Albanians in the process.'43 Ivo Daalder has noted that
"even those who deplored the absence of a more forceful U.S. stance in conflicts
such as Bosnia have often proposed alternative courses of action that minimized at-
tendant costs."'44 Such examples suggest that preemptive intervention, taken at the
beginning of the conflicts, would have been less costly financially and in terms of
the loss of human life.
Proponents of humanitarian intervention also argue that it is fully within the
spirit of the U.N. Charter, even if it is not expressly provided for in the text.'45 Ar-
ticle 1(3) of the Charter states, for example, that one of the main purposes of the
United Nations is "[tio achieve international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction.'14 6 These persons also point to legal norms that have
developed since the Charter was created. These norms include human rights, hu-
manitarian law, and international criminal law.'47 International humanitarian
and criminal law includes the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Genocide
Convention, as well as general principles of warfare conduct that derive from the
Geneva Conventions.'48 Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions mandates
humane treatment of noncombatant civilians and prohibits a variety of acts, such
as torture or murder, from being inflicted on these persons.'49 States are required
to penalize anyone carrying out or ordering actions that amount to "grave
143. Id. at 507.
144. Ivo H. Daalder, The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT, supra note 106, at 461, 485. Daalder also observes
that "[alt times, it may be necessary to limit the costs of inaction by intervening directly in internal
conflict" and that "[t]he costs of inaction, including costs to humanitarian and other important
U.S. interests, tend to be ignored or downplayed" in discussions concerning military intervention.
Id.
145. See Corell,supra note 126, at 3-4.
146. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
147. See generally LEPARD, supra note 127, at 119-36 (tracing the development of human rights
norms).
148. Id. at 130; see Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 32; Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217,75 U.N.T.S. 86; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 136; Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 288 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Genocide Convention, supra note 94.
149. LEPARD, supra note 127, at 130.
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breaches" of the Geneva Conventions.10 These international human rights, hu-
manitarian law, and criminal law norms suggest that the U.N. Charter permits
humanitarian intervention. 5'
3. The Responsibility to Protect
The Canadian government and a number of major foundations responded
to Kofi Annan's challenge to find consensus on humanitarian issues in light of the
concerns that had been raised with regard to humanitarian intervention. In Sep-
tember of 2000, they created the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS), which would "wrestle with the . . . range of ques-
tions-legal, moral, operational and political-rolled up in this debate."'52 The
ICISS conducted meetings around the world to discover the opinions of leaders in
governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, universities, think tanks,
and civil society with regard to the challenge of humanitarian intervention.'53 A
few notable members of the ICISS from the United States included Michael Igna-
tieff and Lee Hamilton. 5 4
The ICISS indeed discovered a common consensus with regard to humani-
tarian interventions and proposed significant changes in the international com-
munity's approach to humanitarian intervention. The report that emerged from
the ICISS, which held the commission's formal findings, was the "Responsibility
to Protect."'5 5 The report was so named for its two foundational principles. The
first principle formally recognized that state sovereignty implies primary respon-
sibility on behalf of the state to secure the protection of its own people. 56 Where
such responsibility is not met, however, the general rule of nonintervention under
international law "yields to the international responsibility to protect.' ' 57 This in-
ternational "responsibility to protect" is the second principle established by the
report.'58
The Responsibility to Protect laid out certain precautionary principles that
states should take and be responsible to when undertaking humanitarian inter-
150. See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 148, art. 147.
151. See LEPARD,supra note 127, at 119; Corell,supra note 126, at 4-5.
152. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, Supra note 111, at VII.
153. See id. at XI.
154. Id. at II.
155. Id.
156. Id. at XI.
157. Id. at XI.
158. Id.
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vention. These principles include undertaking no more than the minimal neces-
sary military action to secure human protection.'59 The commission determined
that the U.N. Security Council is the most appropriate body to sanction humani-
tarian intervention and proposed improvements to the Security Council's autho-
rization of intervention, such as creating a mutual agreement among veto-power
states that they would not exercise their power in cases requiring intervention
when "vital state interests" were not involved. 6 ' Finally, the ICISS proposed cer-
tain operational principles to guide the execution of humanitarian interventions,
including the "[m ]aximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations"
(emphasis added). 6'
The Secretary-General urged the General Assembly to adopt the Responsi-
bility to Protect in his Report, "In Larger Freedom" in 2005.162 The central tenets
of the Responsibility to Protect, along with specific intervention criteria were of-
ficially endorsed in part by a High-level Panel convened by the Secretary-General
on December 2, 2004. 163 The Responsibility to Protect was adopted by the General
Assembly in part in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. The General
Assembly found that "each individual State has the responsibility to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity.'' 64 It also stated:
[W]e are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the
[U.N.] Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and
in cooperation with relevant regional organizations ... should
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are mani-
festly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.... We also
intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to help states
build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
159. Id. at XII.
160. Id. at XII-XIII.
161. Id. at XIII.
162. The Secretary-General, The Report of the Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights For All, 135, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
163. U.N. Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Se-
cure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 199-203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2,2004).
164. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
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ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out (emphasis
added).'
The Security Council reaffirmed these provisions in April 2006.66 This for-
mal adoption of the central principles of the Responsibility to Protect represents a
significant step in the United Nations' approach to humanitarian intervention,
and indicates that states perceive the link between preventive action and internal
conflict. However, it remains to be seen how it will be interpreted and the degree
to which the report will influence future action. It is unclear, for example, whether
these statements create a legal obligation to intervene.' Additionally, the state-
ment affirms that action will still be determined on a case-by-case basis; it does
not delineate specific criteria to guide speedier, systematic action, and the proce-
dure it outlines remains susceptible to many of the traditional obstacles inherent
in U.N. interventions.
III. GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF NGO BEHAVIOR
NGOs have been involved in the Darfur crisis in large numbers. Some ex-
amples of these diverse groups are France's Action Against Hunger, Ireland's
GOAL, the United States' Coalition for International Justice, and Respond, a Eu-
ropean consortium of companies and university groups working to provide accu-
rate and up-to-date maps for the efficient distribution of aid. 6' International
NGOs such as Oxfam and Amnesty International, among others, have also pro-
vided aid.'69
165. Id.
166. S.C. Res. 1674, 4, UN DOC S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
167. Sir Michael Woods, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture at the Lauterpacht Center for
International Law, University of Cambridge (Nov. 9, 2006) (notes available at http://www.lcil.
cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/2006-hersch-lecture_l.pdf, see 's 47-52).
168. For more information on such programs, see, for example, Action Against Hunger, Innova-
tive Programs in the Fight Against Hunger, Sudan Profile, http://www.aah-usa.org/programs/
sudan.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2007); Clark Boyd, Satellite Mapping Aids Darfur Relief, BBC
NEWS, Dec. 25, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4121083.stm; The Hague Justice
Portal, Coalition for International Justice, http://www.frompeacetojustice.nl/eCache/DEF/3/663.
html (last visited Jan. 19, 2007); USAID, The Humanitarian Situation in Sudan, http://www.
usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharanafrica/sudan/index.html (last visited Jan. 19,2007).
169. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, U.N. Resolution to End Impunity in Darfur, WIRE, May 2005, http://
web.amnesty.org/wire/May2005/Sudan; Oxfam.org, Sudan, Crisis in Darfur, http://www.oxfam.
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A new process created by NGOs and used in Sudan is "alliance formation,"
involving coordinated efforts in which NGOs complement each other's work and
increase impact. For example, the Mine Advisory Group from Britain educates
persons on landmines and detection.' 70 This organization collaborated with the
Mine Clearing Group of South Africa, which specializes in mine removal, and
they joined the Sudan Mine Action Service. Together, the alliance removes mines
in Sudan and teaches the surrounding public to identify and avoid potential land-
mine-ridden areas. 7' This is crucial in Sudan because refugees cannot safely re-
turn home across landmine areas. Other examples of alliances come from
numerous International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) country divisions,
which have come to Sudan to provide relief. They coordinate their actions through
a Memorandum of Understanding so as to assure that their efforts do not overlap
and to maximize their resources. 7 1 Sometimes these organizations take their co-
operation even further-the Spanish Red Cross, for example, which provides
food security, primary health care, water, and sanitation, paired with the German
Red Cross, which has an emergency response unit that can care for almost two
thousand persons per week, to provide relief within Sudan.'73
Another strategy NGOs utilize is "external-internal pairing," a process in
which NGOs external to Sudan pair with NGOs and organizations within Sudan
to provide technical guidance and aid distribution. In Sudan, the ICRC has joined
with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS) 74 While the ICRC provides
support and education for the otherwise overwhelmed intrastate organization,
the SRCS supplies the ICRC with a network of volunteers who can physically
spread aid.' One ICRC delegate described this partnership in a recent report:
They [the SRCS] are vital in the distribution of Red Cross mes-
sages and in tracing activities on behalf of members of families
separated by the conflict. [In return, the] ICRC continues to sup-
170. See Mine Advisory Group, About MAG, What Is MAG?, http://www.mag.org.uk/page.
php?p=606&s=4 (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
171. See Mine Advisory Group, About MAG, MAG's Country Programmes, Sudan, http:/fwww.
mag.org.uk/page.php?s= 4 &p=693 (last visited Jan. 19,2007).
172. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Sudan Bulletin No. 19, Focus on the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement's Activities in Sudan (Nov. 9,2004), http:www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
htmlall/66knas?opendocument [hereinafter Sudan Bulletin No. 19].
173. Id.
174. See Int'l Comm. ofthe Red Cross, Crisis in Darfur: ICRC Action in Facts and Figures (Nov. 9,2004),
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmiaIl/674H7P?OpenDocument&style=custo-print.
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port the capacity building of the SRCS, enhancing its ability to mo-
bilize effectively during crises. 76
The ICRC also brings the SRCS aid, international connections, and organi-
zational expertise. 7
External-internal pairing is practiced between the ICRC and its official part-
ners in other countries, as well as between autonomous aid societies. This coordina-
tion among the various elements of the ICRC was formalized in the Agreement on
the Organization of the International Activities of the Components of the Interna-
tional Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 1997.178 The ICRC deputy head of
subdelegation further explains the importance of such symbiotic alliances:
An organization cannot function in Darfur without a good net-
work of contacts and logistics. On the other hand, the complexity
and challenges of the operation in Sudan call for qualified and ex-
perienced personnel, who can be operational within a few days.
This is something the National Societies have to offer along with
financial support for other activities. 9
These NGOs and NGO alliances can be viewed as outgrowths of globaliza-
tion, and fit well within Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's discussion of the three
qualitative changes that have developed out of globalization. ,8o These identified
changes are (1) increased network density, (2) increased "institutional velocity," and
(3) increased transnational participation. 8' In other words, the authors argue that
globalization is increasing the number of connections within networks, the speed at
which institutions and their components change and evolve, and the number of
channels between different societies and actors on the international level. 82
176. Id.
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178. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Significant Dates in the History of International Hu-
manitarian Law and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/
siteengO.nsf/html/section-movementhistory (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).; The ICRC is also sup-
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affected by the Darfur conflict. Sudan Bulletin No. 19,supra note 172.
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182. Keohane and Nye also argue that the effects of these changes are qualitative. See id. at 79.
The authors use the phrase "network density" to refer to the "thickening" of systemic relationships
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Globalization appears to have similar effects on the way NGOs operate. First,
the amount of communication among NGOs is increasing.18 3 Second, NGO ac-
tivity is expanding due to the increased volume and affordability of communica-
tion in the last ten years."' For example, the nonprofit group Association for
Progressive Communications now "provides 50,000 NGOs in 133 countries access
to the tens of millions of Internet users for the price of a local call." ' Third,
NGOs are part of the "complex interdependence" described by Keohane and Nye
that is occurring across borders. Multiple new channels are forming between soci-
eties and both state and nonstate actors."86
The result of these changes is that more actors and organizations are partici-
pating in world politics at greater distances. The fact that the international com-
munity is increasingly wired has also changed the nature of the public's relationship
with NGOs. Internet users can now electronically receive newsletters, make do-
nations, and receive up-to-the-minute information concerning almost any cause
of their choosing. Keohane and Nye note that the "vast expansion of transnational
channels of contact ... generated by the media and a profusion of NGOs, has
helped expand ... the multiple issues connecting societies."'8 7 They conclude that
"NGOs can now raise their voices as never before."'88 NGOs can now draw on
and influence an interest base that spans the world.8 9
among networks. Id. For example, increased trade expansion between developed and developing
countries often stimulates increased industrial activity within the developing country. This, in
turn, can bring a greater awareness of the human rights conditions within the developed country,
and the resulting human rights dialogue between the countries signals a change in the nature of
their relationship. Id. Another example Keohane and Nye use to demonstrate the qualitative ef-
fects of network density is the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Id. Fluctuations in the Asian financial
market threatened markets halfway around the world in a new way due to the greater intercon-
nectedness between regional economic systems. Id.
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Jessica Mathews further examines the growing strength of NGO activity in her
article "Power Shift," in which she asserts that national governments are not only
losing autonomy in a world of globalization, but are increasingly sharing powers-
including security roles-with international organizations and NGOs.'9° Mathews
finds that "nonstate actors have never before approached their current strength.1 9'
She quotes the former head of the U.N. Center for Human Rights, Ibrahima Fall,
as saying "[w]e have less money and fewer resources than Amnesty International,
and we are the arm of the U.N. for human rights."' 92 Mathews further states,
"NGOs deliver more official development assistance than the entire U.N. system.' 93
Mathews finds that NGOs may be strengthening the nation-state system by solving
particular problems states find difficult, and she suggests that nation-states may not
be the natural problem-solving unit for certain issues.114
IV. NGOs, PREVENTIVE AID, AND INTERVENTION
NGOs can be advantageous supplements to states in the development of pre-
ventive aid and rapid-response intervention plans. First, NGOs specialize in partic-
ular issues and geographic regions to a greater degree than any state-based
international organization. Second, each NGO's primary interest is effectiveness in
its areas of expertise, which makes NGOs less vulnerable to corruption than other
organizations. Third, bureaucracy is limited on account of this singular goal, and
NGOs do not have competing branches that might create a deadlock. Finally,
NGOs' objectives are less likely to fluctuate according to political influence or sup-
port. Though some argue that U.N. branches and committees can behave like
NGOs because of their specific focuses, they are still less focused than NGOs and
more reliant on the declarations and bureaucracy of the United Nations.
A. How NGOs Can Make Preventive Aid More Efficient
NGOs can contribute to the provision of preventive aid in a number of ways.
First, they can effectively allocate goods up front, since many have an expertise in the
local culture of a country that comes from a longstanding presence there.'91 Second,
190. Mathews, supra note 184, at 50.
191. Id. at 52.
192. Id. at 53.
193. This excludes the World Bank and the IMF. Id.
194. Id. at 65.
195. See Press Release, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., Role of Civil Society in Humanitarian Intervention
Subject of DPI/NGO Conference Panel Discussion, U.N. Doc. NGO/378 P1/1277 (Aug. 29, 2000),
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they can use their particular specialties to fill gaps in aid distribution. If a project in-
volves systems building, as the MDGs do, NGOs and NGO alliances can bring exper-
tise to solving certain problems, particularly if those problems are specific to a region.'96
Third, because NGOs are often less vulnerable to corruption than the governments of
the countries targeted for aid, they can be the favored recipients of aid, holding the
resources in trust for the public. Fourth, when such governments are corrupt or un-
friendly to the United Nations or other state organizations, NGOs are important aid
distributors.' Fifth, the expanding networks among NGOs themselves allow NGOs
to contribute important information and planning resources to other groups, such as
state actors or the United Nations, seeking to distribute aid effectively.
While distributing preventive aid, as Jeffrey Sachs suggests,9 ' NGOs help to al-
locate resources efficiently up front by pinpointing where they will be most effective.
Sachs also recommends that NGOs be utilized to help monitor aid distribution and
use.' 9 NGOs have the added ability to distribute aid in regions of conflict because
hostile governments find NGOs less threatening than United Nations-affiliated
bodies or state actors.2 ° By mentoring intrastate organizations through external-in-
ternal pairing, NGOs can facilitate systems-development in regions such as sub-Sa-
haran Africa. The Responsibility to Protect Report further notes that NGOs help to
galvanize domestic and foreign public opinion in support of prevention measures.
B. How NGOs Can Make Humanitarian Intervention Less Invasive and More
Palatable for States
At the fifty-third annual Department of Public Information/Non-Govern-
mental Organization Conference, a panel discussed the role of civil society in hu-
manitarian intervention. 0' The panel suggested a number of contributions NGOs
could uniquely make to humanitarian interventions if encouraged to participate
more directly in the interventions. Among the potential payoffs were increased
transparency, more accurate predictions, increased oversight, the provision of timely
information, and improved legitimacy."2 NGOs have much to offer in these regards.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000829.ngo378.doc.html [hereinafter Role of Civil
Society].
196. See id.
197. Sachs,supra note 101, at 174-75.
198. See id. at 174.
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In deciding to approve humanitarian intervention, states are confronted with the
risks that interventions will be disproportionate to the conflict at hand or used inap-
propriately. It follows that if the mandatory involvement of NGOs can be secured in
the decision-making, implementation, and follow-up of humanitarian interven-
tions, the risks confronted by states will be much lowered.2°3
The benefits NGOs can lend to humanitarian intervention if incorporated in
the process are great. Before intrastate conflicts escalate, NGOs can help predict the
escalation of violence and where it may occur. For example, a handful of NGOs are
currently studying how early-warning systems can be established to predict internal
warfare likely to reach the level of genocide. Three of these pioneers are the Center
for the Prevention of Genocide,204 the International Campaign to End Genocide,
and the International Crisis Group. 25 Before the Center for the Prevention of Geno-
cide ceased activity, it used "satellite imaging, on the ground resources, and a net-
work of NGO, governmental and international organizations to compile and
publish evidence [of genocide onset]."2 6 The International Campaign to End Geno-
cide is a coalition of NGOs that have come together across state lines to brainstorm
and lobby for preemptive methods. 07 While these NGOs already monitor at-risk
areas and have their own channels through which they broadcast warnings, they
are all working toward the creation of a stronger organizational body with govern-
ment contacts for greater political clout.2 8 The purpose of such systems is to get
major actors moving earlier so that any type of intervention, whether diplomatic,
military, or economic, can be expedited.0 9 The Responsibility to Protect Report
noted the "increasingly significant role played by NGOs, particularly in the context
of early warning efforts."2 It further encouraged the international community to
support the U.N. in the establishment of an early warning capability."'
Before intervention, NGOs can provide "adequate, timely and accurate infor-
203. Id.
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mation" concerning the realities of the situation on the ground."2 National NGOs
are probably best situated to do this, since they "deal directly with the target popula-
tions.""' NGOs can also help accurately judge the effectiveness and timeliness of
intervention, as well as plan and prioritize division of responsibilities between actors
at the earliest stages. States gain legitimacy in their undertakings by giving reputa-
ble NGOs a louder voice before and during interventions to provide support that
justifies intervention for the purpose of upholding human rights. Furthermore,
NGOs can provide a stern, motivating voice to states in the General Assembly or
Security Council by continually advocating for the civil society on the ground. This
voice might help states look past individual concerns regarding humanitarian inter-
vention and focus on the urgency of the matter at hand. For example, the pressure
toward humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo has been attributed to the
information revolution, which informed the international civil society at the time of
the events that transpired."4 Certainly, NGOs played a large role in the dissemina-
tion of such information then, and play an even larger role today."5
During intervention, NGO knowledge can be used to save civilian lives
through institutionalized lines of communication established by the U.N. NGOs
who have been on the ground at the time of conflict can provide a well-informed
opinion on the effectiveness of state action. They can help educate peacekeeping
or military troops about human rights and the culture into which they are being
placed. NGOs can increase transparency by regularly reporting on the situation
as it unfolds. NGO networks can help illuminate what is actually occurring in
countries experiencing intrastate conflict, especially since the outsider perspective
often becomes blurred in countries with few communications resources. 1 6 Finally,
in the follow-up to post-conflict devastation, NGOs and alliances can offer unique
services, such as those demonstrated by the landmine coalition."'
Requiring NGO approval, cooperation, and leadership, and providing cer-
tain reputable organizations with a meaningful line of communication to the
U.N. from the onset of serious internal conflict, may encourage the Security
Council to be more receptive to the possibility of humanitarian intervention at an
earlier stage. Routes of potential action could be considered and proposed to the
212. Role of Civil Society, supra note 195.
213. Id.
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Security Council by NGOs from the first sign of massive human rights violations.
Once states volunteer to undertake a course of intervention with significant back-
ing from NGOs, the proposed course of action should be more appealing to the
Security Council as a whole than proposals offered by states alone. Measures such
as demanding that intervening states work closely with NGOs, that NGOs mon-
itor the intervention, and that NGOs submit regular updates independent of state
reports to the Security Council throughout an intervention could lessen some of
the concerns states have in permitting humanitarian intervention.
CONCLUSION
For more than three years since the inception of the conflict, genocidal acts in
Darfur continued relatively unaffected by external political influences. Refugees
languished in camps, fearful and unable to return home; the fighting between the
government and smaller African rebel groups continued; and the killing, raping,
mutilation, and bombing of innocent civilians and children by state-sponsored
forces was pervasive. Salih Booker, executive director of Africa Action, explained
in early 2005 that the government felt free to continue its genocidal slaughter be-
cause "the [Sudanese] government believes the international community is not
going to intervene."218s
States can more efficiently begin to tackle intrastate conflicts and humanitar-
ian crises like that in Sudan with three steps. First, states should recognize that
intrastate conflicts and humanitarian crises are collective action problems, and
acknowledge that preventive aid systems and a pre-established, coordinated pro-
cess of intervention, such as that proposed by The Responsibility to Protect, 21 9
would be less costly and more effective than current, multilateral strategies. Sec-
ond, minimal conditions for intervention should be decided upon without pres-
sure on states to become immediately bound. Third, states should invite NGOs to
help them plan and execute both procedures. Heavier inclusion of NGOs in inter-
vention processes should make the concept of humanitarian intervention less
threatening to states.
It is apparent that internal conflicts and humanitarian disasters like those in
Sudan demand a global, multifaceted response. States should strive to utilize to the
fullest degree the most recent and effective outgrowths ofglobalization-the NGOs
and their organizational methods. An NGO-incorporated model would improve
218. Killing Conflict, supra note 10.
219. See THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 111, at XI-XIII.
NGOs, PREVENTION, AND INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 179
preventive aid efforts by institutionalizing measures that can anticipate conflict or
crisis and quicken reaction time, and by creating a coordinated, multifaceted pro-
cess that can meet the complexities of internal conflict and humanitarian crisis on
the many dimensions on which it occurs. This cooperation would not transform
NGOs into government actors; instead, it would include them in a scripted and
prescriptive response to intrastate conflict and humanitarian crisis. Most impor-
tantly, such integration would improve the international community's response to
intrastate warfare such as that which has languished for over three years in Darfur.
NGOs' innovative responses and broadening capacities, viewed in concert with the
state system's failure to prevent or efficiently preempt internal wars of great magni-
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